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Abstract
We analyze a model of ’postelection politics’, in which (unlike in the more
common Downsian models of ’preelection politics’) politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician
in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type
by introducing heterogeneity in voters’ ideological preferences, and analyze how
voters’ reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing
incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent
for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a ’median voter theorem’: the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible
level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically
Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.
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Introduction

Following the approach of Downs (1957), most political economy models assume
that electoral promises made by political candidates are binding and enforceable
(either directly, or implicitly through reputational or other mechanisms). Persson
and Tabellini (2000) label this approach the study of “preelection politics”. In these
models, the primary role of elections is to choose policies via the choice of candidates
who are irrevocably committed to a known policy stance.1 The aim is to predict
the policy that will be implemented (or, equivalently, the candidate who will be
elected), given that voters have heterogeneous preferences over policy. The most
famous result in this vein is of course the median voter theorem. As is well known,
this depends crucially on the assumption that electoral promises are binding (e.g.
Alesina, 1988). This naturally raises the question of how politics can be modeled in
contexts where precommitment is unavailable.
There exists an alternative tradition in political economy of what Persson and
Tabellini (2000) call “postelection politics”. This approach assumes that electoral
promises are not enforceable, and analyzes how voters’ backward-looking behavior
in deciding whether to reelect incumbent politicians can constrain the set of policies
chosen by those incumbents. Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) develop models in
this tradition that involve moral hazard - the incumbent’s policy choice is observed
with noise by voters, who adopt retrospective voting rules that seek to discipline
the incumbent. Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998) generalize this framework to
consider politicians of di¤erent types, and so incorporate adverse selection as well as
moral hazard. More recently, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000; hereafter PRT)
use a symmetric information version of this framework as the basis of a comparative
analysis of political institutions. The incompleteness of political contracts gives
incumbents some discretionary power while in o¢ce. Incumbents are thus able to
extract a positive level of rent in equilibrium, even in the absence of the informational
rents available in the asymmetric information models.
These models of postelection politics all assume that voters are homogeneous
in their policy preferences (or at least that voters coordinate their strategies perfectly). The aim of this paper is to generalize the postelection politics framework to
incorporate voter heterogeneity in policy preferences (along some dimensional that
is orthogonal to rents). Like PRT, we examine the symmetric information case, and
1

In addition to the Downsian framework, models of probabilistic political competition (e.g.
Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) can also be regarded as falling within the category of preelection
politics.

2

thus ignore issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. Our framework involves
an in…nite sequence of periods, within each of which the following game is played
between an incumbent o¢ceholder and a …nite set of voters. Voters noncooperatively choose their (retrospective) reelection strategies (specifying a minimum level
of utility that is required for them to vote for the incumbent’s reelection). The incumbent chooses a policy, which involves both a level of rent to extract, and a point
along a one-dimensional policy space (similar to that of Downsian models). Then,
elections are held, pitting the incumbent against an exogenously chosen challenger.
Politicians are assumed to maximize the present value of rents they obtain from
o¢ce, while voters all wish to minimize rents, but have heterogeneous preferences
over the other policy dimension (which we label “ideology”).
While extremely simple, this framework allows us to pose the question of what
(ideological) policy can be expected to prevail in equilibrium, in addition to determining the equilibrium level of rent. In contrast, the previous literature has focused
only on the latter issue. We …rst characterize the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes,
showing that virtually any point in the policy space can be sustained in equilibrium.
This is in sharp contrast to the prediction of the Downsian model of preelection politics that the median voter’s preferred outcome will be implemented. Moreover, any
feasible level of rent can be extracted by the incumbent in equilibrium. In the existing literature on postelection politics (e.g. PRT), it is assumed that coordination
among voters will force the incumbent down to the lowest level of rent consistent
with the incumbent’s discretionary authority. In contrast, our results show that once
we introduce heterogeneity among voters, elections do not necessarily place any constraints on incumbents’ rents, even when all voters have identical preferences over
the level of rents.
We then re…ne the set of Nash equilibria, and show that there exists a unique
policy that can be supported as a strong Nash equilibrium (in the sense of Aumann
(1959)). This policy combines the median voter’s preferred ideological outcome
and the minimum level of rent that is consistent with the incumbent’s short-term
discretionary authority. This constitutes our “median voter theorem”; it can be
viewed as a counterpart to the analogous result in the theory of preelection politics.
However, it relies on a more restrictive solution concept, in particular, on deviations
that may not be self-enforcing, and hence on binding commitments (or at least
implicit conventions) among voters.
To address this issue, we analyze the coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim,
Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) of the postelection politics game (thus considering only
3

self-enforcing deviations). While there exist some nonmedian policies that are supported by coalition-proof equilibria, we introduce a re…nement, based on “ideological
loyalty” in voting strategies, and show that the median voter outcome is the unique
policy supported by a coalition-proof equilibrium in ideologically loyal strategies.
The main contribution of this paper is to present a median voter result for postelection politics that can serve as a counterpart to analogous results in the study
of preelection politics. There are a number of signi…cant lessons to be drawn from
this analysis. Most fundamentally, the game of postelection politics that we analyze
yields outcomes that converge on the center of the distribution of voters’ preferences; moreover, the rents that incumbent politicians can extract while in o¢ce are
restricted to the minimal level consistent with the contractual incompleteness of political constitutions. While these results are encouraging, it should be emphasized
that they rely on stringent requirements in terms of the enforceability of agreements
and the existence of communication or coordination though implicit conventions
among voters. A Nash equilibrium outcome alone will not, in general, yield ideological policies that re‡ect the median voter’s preferences, nor will it constrain the
rent-seeking of incumbent politicians. Our results thus provide some grounds for
pessimism about the ability of electoral politics to constrain politicians’ opportunistic behavior in circumstances where policy platforms are not binding.
This paper is related to a number of strands within the political economy literature, in addition to those already mentioned. Our framework, with a large number
of voters whose strategic choices a¤ect the incentives facing the incumbent, is analogous in some respects to common agency models of lobbying (e.g. Grossman and
Helpman, 1994; Dixit, Grossman and Helpman, 1997; Dharmapala, 1999). In these
models, there are many principals (lobby groups) with con‡icting interests concerning a policy chosen by the agent (the government). Using the menu auction
approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), common agency lobbying models allow lobby groups to express their willingness-to-pay for di¤erent policies by o¤ering
the government payment schedules, conditioned on the implemented policy. We do
not adopt this type of framework here, because voters (unlike lobby groups) can
only make a binary choice, namely whether or not to reelect the incumbent. Thus,
while we also address a situation of common agency, the strategies available to the
principals are very di¤erent.
In our model, there is a unidimensional policy issue (“ideology”) as well as a
second dimension - rents - over which voters have common preferences. There has
been some analysis in the political science literature of Downsian models with this
4

type of policy space; the dimension along which voters agree is termed a “valence”
issue (e.g. Groseclose, 2001). Such models, however, have been developed within
the tradition of preelection politics, assuming binding promises by candidates.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The basic model is presented in Section
2; then, the Nash equilibria are characterized in Section 3. The median voter result is
derived in Section 4, and alternative equilibrium re…nements are analyzed in Section
5. Section 6 discusses the implications, and concludes.

2

The Model

2.1

Basic Assumptions

The agents in our model consist of an odd, …nite number of voters N, where N ¸
5, and a set of politicians. One of the politicians (hereafter referred to as the
incumbent) is exogenously chosen to be in o¢ce at the beginning of the game (the
other politicians are referred to as the challengers). The incumbent’s task is to
implement a policy, chosen from the set of feasible policies. This set, denoted -, is
assumed to be a compact, convex subset of R2. A typical policy, denoted (x; r) 2 -,
consists of two elements:
i) x 2 R is a unidimensional general policy space; this can be viewed as analogous
to the policy space in standard Downsian models of preelection politics, and can be
interpreted, for example, as “ideology.”
ii) r 2 [0; rmax ] is the “rent” captured by the incumbent while in o¢ce; this can
be interpreted as the private bene…ts of o¢ceholding. Rents are nonnegative, and
bounded above by some …nite amount r max that represents the maximum amount
of rent that an incumbent can extract while in o¢ce.
For a given general policy x, and strictly positive r, it is assumed that it is always
possible to implement any lower level of r (that is, the set of feasible policies does
not constrain reductions in r, unless r = 0):
(x; r) 2 - and

0 · r0 < r

)

(x; r0 ) 2 -:

(1)

In the basic Downsian model of preelection politics, candidates for political o¢ce
are assumed to care simply about winning o¢ce.2 Similarly, existing models of
postelection politics (e.g. PRT) assume that politicians (including the incumbent)
are simply interested in maximizing rents. In essence, we adopt this assumption:
2 There

have, however, been extensions that analyze the behavior of policy-motivated politicians
(e.g. Wittman, 1977; Calvert, 1985) - see Section 6 below.
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thus, the objective of the incumbent is to maximize the present value of rents from
o¢ce. Moreover, all politicians have this aim, conditional on being in o¢ce - a
nonincumbent politician who is elected to o¢ce will also seek to maximize the present
value of rents from o¢ce. Hence, an incumbent’s per-period payo¤ is simply r. It is
assumed that the default payo¤ for a politician who is not in o¢ce is 0. Politicians
are assumed to have a discount rate of ± 2 (0; 1).
In a model such as that of PRT, the assumption of rent-maximization leads incumbents to well-de…ned preferences over the feasible policies. Here, we introduce
an additional policy dimension x, that is of no direct concern to politicians. Hence,
the choice of x by a purely rent-maximizing politician will not be well-de…ned (as
she would be indi¤erent among all policies in the x-dimension for given r). In other
words, the incumbent’s best response may be a correspondence and not a function
of voters’ reelection strategies. To avoid such mathematical complexities, we introduce the following tie-breaking assumption: if the incumbent is indi¤erent between
(x1; r) and (x2; r) with x1 6= x2 , there exists some exogenously given selection criterion that determines an unique choice of x. Moreover, this selection criterion is
identical for all politicians (i.e. for the incumbent and her potential challengers
alike). This assumption does not amount to assuming policy-motivated politicians
(e.g. Wittman, 1977); rather, it resembles lexicographic preferences. The incumbent
prefers the policy with the highest r, but for given r has some means of choosing
among the feasible values of x. Hence, politicians’ preferences over policy de…ne a
complete order over - (rather than simply a partial order); that is, the incumbent
is never indi¤erent between two distinct policies. This assumption greatly improves
the tractability of the model, but does not fundamentally a¤ect the results. It should
be remembered that we show below that virtually any policy can be sustained in
a Nash equilibrium; thus, allowing the incumbent to be indi¤erent among di¤erent
x’s would only reinforce this.
Voter i; i 2 f1; :::; N g, is assumed to have preferences over the 2-dimensional
policy space described by ui (x; r) = vi (x) ¡ r, where functions vi (:) (and therefore
functions ui (:; :)) are continuous and strictly quasi-concave. 3 For some …xed level of
rent, an ideal point for voter i along the x-dimension is de…ned by:
max

(x;r)2-

ui (x; r)

s:t: r ¸ r¹

(2)

(i.e. x¤i = arg maxui (x; r), subject to r ¸ r¹). Since ui is continuous and - is
x

3

Most of results still hold without additively separable utility functions for voters. This assumption has only been made for ease of presentation.
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compact, ideal points exist. Moreover, the strict quasi-concavity of ui (:), together
with the convexity of -, implies the uniqueness of the ideal points. Equivalently, a
voter i’s ideal point along the x-dimension solves:
max

vi (x)

x2-

(3)

so it is independent of r. Thus, we can identify a voter i simply by her ideal point
along the x-dimension, i.e. x¤i . By duality:
(¹
x; ¹r) is an ideal point for voter i

,

max r s:t : ui (x; r) ¸ ui (¹
x; r¹)

(x;r)2-

(4)

Suppose (without loss of generality) that we order voters according to their ideal
points (in ascending order), so that i < j =) x¤i · x¤j . Hence, x¤m is the median
voter’s ideal point in the x-dimension, where m = N 2+1 . The strict quasi-concavity of
ui (:; :) ensures the single-peakedness of individual preferences (as in Black’s (1948)
original proof of the median voter theorem). We also impose on voter preferences a
condition based on the single crossing property (SCP) of Gans and Smart (1996) (as
well as some additional restrictions on individual preferences). Note that the SCP
has to be modi…ed in our context because we have more than one policy dimension.
Initially, suppose we ignore the r-dimension and assume that the SCP holds for the
x-dimension. Let vi(x) represent voter i’s preferences over x. Then, the SCP entails
that the following condition is satis…ed:
If

i<j

and x1 ¸ x2

vi(x1 ) ¸ vi(x2)

)

(5)
vj (x1) > vj (x2)

Under the separability assumptions made above, it is possible to extend the SCP
to the following 2-dimensional version:
If

i< j

and

(6)

x1 ¸ x2

ui (x1 ; r1) ¸ ui (x2 ; r2)

)

uj (x1; r1) > uj (x2; r2)

uj (x2 ; r2) ¸ uj (x1; r1)

)

ui (x2; r2) > ui (x1 ; r1)

If i < j, and x1 ¸ x2 , i is more likely to prefer (x2; r2 ) to (x1; r1) whereas j is
more likely to prefer (x1; r1) to (x2; r2). However, if i prefers (x1 ; r1) to (x2 ; r2) (for
instance, because r1 is su¢ciently smaller than r2) the SCP condition guarantees
that a fortiori j also prefers (x1 ; r1) to (x2; r2). However, if j prefers (x2 ; r2) to
(x1; r1 ), then a fortiori i also prefers (x2 ; r2) to (x1; r 1) :
7

Finally, we assume that politicians are “nonextreme” in the following sense.
Consider two policies (x1 ; r) and (x2; r) with the same level of rent r; if x1 is “extreme” (i.e. x1 < x¤2 or x1 > x¤N¡1 ), while x2 is not, then politicians prefer (x2 ; r) to
(x1; r). This assumption slightly extends the lexicographic preferences of politicians
discussed above, but is a very mild condition, as it only rules out the most extreme
ideologies.

2.2

The Game

As in PRT, the political game involves an in…nite sequence of periods. At the beginning of period t, one of the politicians (the incumbent) is exogenously in o¢ce.
Voters choose their reelection strategies (specifying a cuto¤ level of utility, denoted
bi, below which they will vote against the incumbent’s reelection). Then, the incumbent implements a policy (x; r) 2 -, after which an election is held. In the election,
each voter votes, either for the incumbent or for a challenger (chosen from the set
of nonincumbent politicians, all of whom are identical ex ante). If the incumbent is
relected, then a new period (t + 1) starts with the same incumbent in o¢ce; if the
incumbent is not reelected, then a new period starts with the challenger in o¢ce
(it is assumed that a defeated incumbent can never return to o¢ce). This process
is repeated in…nitely, with the continuation value for an incumbent of reelection
being determined endogenously. In such an analysis, attention is typically restricted
to stationary equilibria of the in…nitely repeated game (i.e. equilibria in strategies
that are independent of t). Thus, there is no signi…cant loss of generality in focusing on only one stage of this in…nitely repeated game, and assuming an exogenous
continuation value (denoted W ) from reelection.
The game (which will be denoted by ¡) can thus be summarized as follows:
1. Each voter i; i 2 f1; :::; Ng ; noncooperatively chooses a reservation utility
bi 2 R
¡
¢
2. The incumbent chooses a policy xP ; rP 2 - to implement
3. Elections are held. Each voter i; i 2 f1; :::; Ng ; votes for the reelection of the
¡
¢
incumbent i¤ ui xP ; rP ¸ bi ; otherwise, i votes for the challenger
4. Payo¤s are realized

The action space and strategy space for each voter i is simply the choice of
a reservation utility bi 2 R. These choices de…ne an N¡dimensional vector b of
8

reservation utilities for all voters. For the incumbent, the action space is simply a
policy (x; r) 2 -. However, the strategy space is a mapping from b to a policy, and
can be expressed as follows:
((x; r)jb) :RN 7! -

(7)

¡
¢
(the implemented policy will be denoted by xP ; rP and the optimal strategy for the
incumbent, given a vector b, by (x¤ ; r ¤jb)). Note that when we consider a deviation
by one or more voters from the strategy embodied in b, the actions of the incumbent
cannot be held …xed, but rather must be reoptimized with respect to the new b, in
accordance with the given strategy (x; r j b). Note also that politicians other than
the incumbent (the potential challengers) are not strategic actors in this model.
The voters’ choices of reservation utilities, b, together with the incumbent’s
choice of strategy (x; r j b), de…ne a voting pattern in stage 3 of the game. This can
be formally represented by the indicator variable Ii, de…ned as follows:
½
¡
¢
1 if ui xP ; r P ¸ bi
Ii =
(8)
0 otherwise
i.e. Ii = 1 if voter i votes for the incumbent’s reelection, and is 0 otherwise. The
pattern of voting is summarized by the N¡dimensional vector I. It is assumed that
voters’ payo¤s depend only on policy outcomes, and not directly on how they vote.
¡
¢
Thus, voter i receives payo¤ ui xP ; rP in stage 4 of the game. The incumbent
receives a payo¤ denoted by UI , where:
½ P
PN
N+1
r + ±W if
i=1 Ii ¸ 2
UI =
(9)
rP
otherwise
(i.e. the rents and the continuation value of being reelected, if a majority voters
vote for reelection, or simply the rents if the challenger is elected).
This game closely resembles the electoral process modeled in PRT. The novel
elements here are the heterogeneity of voters’ preferences over x, and the lack of
cooperation among them. It may appear that the game imposes a requirement
that voters are committed to apply in stage 3 a reelection rule decided in stage
1. An assumption of precommitment to a reservation utility would be problematic,
especially as one of the rationales for analyzing models of postelection politics is that
politicians may …nd it di¢cult to precommit to policies. It should be emphasized,
however, that precommitment does not in fact play a crucial role in our model.
Under our assumptions, all politicians are equally opportunistic. Thus, when stage
3 of the game is reached, voters are indi¤erent with respect to whether the incumbent
9

or the challenger will be in o¢ce for the next period. Hence, for a voter in stage
3, following the reelection rule announced in stage 1 leads to the same payo¤ as
the maximum payo¤ available by departing from this rule. That is, all of the Nash
equilibria derived below are subgame-perfect. Allowing voters to reoptimize their
reelection rule in stage 3 (in e¤ect, making Ii a choice variable for voter i in stage
3) does not fundamentally a¤ect the results. Rather, as argued by PRT (pp. 11321133), the assumption that voters adhere to the announcements made in stage 1
serves more as an equilibrium selection criterion. Allowing reoptimization in stage
3 admits a range of additional equilibria, but does not fundamentally alter the
conclusions (bearing in mind that we show in the next section that virtually any
policy can be supported as a Nash equilibrium).

3

Characterizing the Set of Nash Equilibria

A Nash equilibrium of the game ¡ can be de…ned as follows:
De…nition 1 A Nash equilibrium of ¡ consists of:
(i) an N¡dimensional vector b, and
¡
¢
(ii) an implemented policy xP ; rP
(noting that these together de…ne a voting pattern I) such that:
a) bi 2 R 8i = 1; :::; N
¡
¢
b) xP ; r P 2 ¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢
0
0
c) UI xP ; rP jb ¸ UI x0 ; r jb for any (x0 ; r ) 6= xP ; rP
¡
¢
¡
¢
0
0
d) ui xP ; r P jbi ; b¡i ¸ ui x¤ ; r¤jbi ; b¡i for any bi 6= bi and for the incumbent’s
¡
¢
0
optimal strategy x¤; r ¤jbi ; b¡i , 8i = 1; :::; N (where b¡i denotes the reservation
utilities of all voters other than i)
The individual rationality condition for the incumbent ((c) above) can be clari…ed
further by considering the available strategies. Note …rstly that the incumbent faces
¡
¢
no constraints (other than that of feasibility, xP ; rP 2 -) while in o¢ce. In this
sense, models of postelection politics assume that the political contract is incomplete
in that it cannot specify politicians’ actions while in o¢ce (PRT, pp. 1122). The
only means of control available to voters is to vote against the incumbent ex post.
Thus, if the incumbent does not anticipate being reelected, she will always simply
choose to extract the maximum possible level of rent rmax - in this case, she in
e¤ect does not seek reelection, and receives a lifetime payo¤ of rmax . Alternatively,
suppose that she seeks reelection: her problem is then to maximize rents, subject to
10

the constraint of obtaining a majority of votes. Suppose that r ¤ is the level of rent
that solves this problem, while securing reelection.4 Then, the incumbent’s payo¤
is r ¤ + ±W ; clearly, unless r ¤ + ±W ¸ rmax , the incumbent will prefer to simply
extract r max and forego the prospect of reelection. Thus, there exists some value of
r¤ (hereafter denoted by rmin) below which seeking reelection is no longer rational
for the incumbent; this value is de…ned by:
rmin = rmax ¡ ±W

(10)

In other words, voters must allow the incumbent to secure rents of at least r min , in
order to induce the incumbent to not extract rmax . Thus, the requirement that
rP ¸ r min

(11)

constitutes, in e¤ect, the incumbent’s incentive compatibility constraint.
The set of Nash equilibria of ¡ is characterized in the following proposition (all
proofs are in the Appendix):
Proposition 2 The set of policies sustained by the Nash equilibria of ¡ is:
©

£
¤
ª
(x; r) j x 2 x¤2 ; x¤N ¡1 ; r 2 [r min ; r max]

(12)

This implies that virtually any feasible policy can be supported by a Nash equilibrium (and the set would be even larger had we not imposed the assumption of
nonextremism, in the interests of tractability). This provides a stark contrast to the
Downsian model, where the only policy position supported by a Nash equilibrium
among the candidates is the median voter’s preferred outcome. Perhaps most signi…cant is the fact that any feasible level of rent (including the maximum possible
level rmax ) can be extracted by the incumbent politician, while securing reelection.
In the existing literature on postelection politics (e.g. PRT), it is claimed that coordination among voters will force the incumbent down to the lowest level of rent
consistent with the incumbent seeking reelection (r min in our notation). In contrast,
our result shows that once we introduce heterogeneity among voters, elections do
not necessarily place any constraints on incumbents’ rents, even when all voters have
identical preferences over the level of rents.
Our characterization of the set of Nash equilibria is intended primarily as a
preliminary step in our derivation of the subsequent results. The conclusions are
4
Note that the assumption of lexicographic preferences implies that there exists a unique x in
the maximization of this problem.
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not particularly surprising, and are analogous to results in the existing literature.
For instance, Roemer (1998) shows that adding a policy dimension (“religion”) that
is orthogonal to tax policy can induce a low-income majority of voters to refrain
from imposing high taxes on those with high incomes (even though they would
do so if taxes were the only policy dimension). Casamatta (2003) introduces an
orthogonal dimension into a model of voting over pension policy, and shows that
retirees may secure favorable pension policies, even when they are in a minority. It
is worth noting, however, that notwithstanding the multiplicity of equilibria, our
model implies the following robust result. With heterogeneous voters, equilibrium
rents are always (weakly) higher than in the typical postelection politics model with
homogeneous voters (e.g. PRT).
r

1
5

E
r’

2

4

3
x*1

x
x’

x*2 x*3

x*4

x*5

Figure 1: An example of a Nash equilibrium that induces a nonmedian policy and
a high level of rents.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of a Nash equilibrium with N = 5, r > rmin and
x 6= x¤m . Indi¤erence curves for each voter in the policy space - are represented
by the bold curves. The horizontal axis corresponds to the ideological dimension
x, and the vertical axis corresponds to the level of rent r. Hence, the incumbent’s
policy can be represented as a point in the graph; the higher the point, the better
o¤ is the incumbent.
The incumbent can guarantee voter i the same level of utility notwithstanding
a higher r, the closer x is to voter i’s preferred ideology x¤i . This, together with
the strict quasi-concavity assumption, implies that indi¤erence curves are hump
shaped. By the additional separability assumption, each pair of indi¤erence curves
of a single voter di¤ers only by a vertical translation. Moving upward in the policy
12

space corresponds to a lower level of utility. Furthermore, the SCP condition (6)
guarantees that each pair of indi¤erence curves of two di¤erent voters intersects
only once, with that of the voter with the higher index having a larger slope.
For all voters, the choice of a reservation utility bi is graphically depicted by the
selection of one indi¤erence curve in the policy space. Any policy below (above)
this indi¤erence curve induces voter i to vote for (against) the incumbent’s reelection. Hence, given any pro…le of reelection strategies (i.e. any pro…le of indi¤erence
curves), an incumbent who seeks reelection selects the highest policy (weakly) below
at least three indi¤erence curves. Given the depicted pro…le of re-election strategies,
the incumbent’s best response is E = (x¤ ; r¤ ). The winning coalition consists of
voters {1, 2, 4, 5g while 3 votes against reelection.
This pro…le of reelection strategies is a Nash equilibrium only if each voter is
unable to strictly increase her payo¤ by a unilateral deviation. Voter 3 can only
change the implemented policy by decreasing her reservation utility; this, however,
implies a decrease in her payo¤. For any other voter, increasing her reservation
utility removes her from the winning coalition without changing the implemented
policy. Finally, decreasing her reservation utility can only change the implemented
policy in a way that decreases her payo¤.
Thus, none of these voters can unilaterally induce the incumbent to change
policy. However, a simultaneous deviation by f1; 2g to higher reservation utilities
can move policy towards the median outcome. We thus turn in the next section
to re…ning the set of equilibria, using concepts based on multilateral deviations by
coalitions of voters.

4

A Median Voter Theorem

A well-known re…nement of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games is the concept
of strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959):
De…nition 3 A Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) is a Nash equilibrium at which
there does not exist any joint deviation by a subset of voters that makes each deviating
voter strictly better o¤.
SNE is a very restrictive equilibrium concept, and strong Nash equilibria do not
exist in many games. However, we show in this section that there exist strong Nash
equilibria of ¡, and that, moreover, there is a unique policy that is supported by
any strong Nash equilibrium. This policy involves the implementation of the median
13

voter’s preferred outcome along the x-dimension, together with the lowest level of
rent consistent with the incumbent’s incentive compatibility constraint (i.e. r min ). 5
We label this a “median voter theorem” because, like the most famous result in the
theory of preelection politics (Downs, 1957), it establishes conditions under which
the median voter’s preferred outcome can be expected to prevail as the implemented
policy.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique policy outcome of ¡ that can be supported by
a Strong Nash Equilibrium pro…le of voter strategies; this policy is (x¤m; r min ), where
x¤m is the median voter’s ideal point.
The basic intuition for this result is the following. Consider any Nash equilibrium
¡
¢
that induces a nonmedian policy (i.e. some policy other than xm ; r min ). Such an
equilibrium is always vulnerable to a deviation by a majority of voters. For instance,
suppose that the policy involves an x that is strictly to the right of the median.
Then, all voters to the left of the median, together with the median voter, will be
strictly better o¤ by deviating to a pro…le of strategies that induces the incumbent
¡
¢
to implement xm ; rmin . Moreover, since this subset of deviating voters constitutes
a majority, their deviation will be successful in inducing this policy. This is su¢cient
to establish that an x that is strictly to the right of the median cannot be sustained
in a strong Nash equilibrium (analogous arguments are possible for an x that is
strictly to the left of the median, and for a policy (xm ; r) where r > r min ). When
¡
¢
the equilibrium policy is xm ; rmin , however, those voters who wish to change policy
in a given direction are in a minority - all voters strictly to the left of the median
wish to move policy to the left, while all those strictly to the right of the median
wish to move policy to the right, but neither group constitutes a majority.
This median voter theorem establishes that the policy outcomes of postelection
politics can be predicted in certain circumstances. It should be noted, however,
that this result relies on the use of the strong Nash equilibrium concept, which is
more restrictive than that in the previous section (and in the previous literature).
It is generally thought to require binding commitments among players, because the
joint deviations that are envisaged in the derivation of strong Nash equilibria (and of
Majoritarian Nash Equilibria) may not be self-enforcing, in the sense that there may
exist further pro…table deviations by subsets of voters from these joint deviations.
5

This result also holds for a slightly less retrictive equilibrium concept that we term Ma joritarian
Nash equilibrium (MNE), de…ned as follows: a Ma joritarian Nash Equilibrium (MNE) is a Nash
equilibrium at which there does not exist any joint deviation by a subset of at least m voters that
makes each deviating voter strictly better o¤ (i.e. there does not exist any joint deviation that
makes a majority of voters better o¤ ). See Appendix 7.2 for details.
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However, the existence of a unique policy that can be sustained as a SNE can
perhaps be argued to serve as a coordination device for voters. In addition, it could
be argued that political parties are likely to develop in this type of setting, and
that they can coordinate pro…table deviations from Nash behavior (see CarbonellNicolau and Klor (2003) for a similar argument justifying the use of SNE in a voting
model). Of course, some of these deviations may not be self-enforcing, involving
behavior that is not individually rational for each deviator (for instance, there may
exist a pro…table deviation for a subset of voters from a deviation coordinated by a
political party). Even so, one may argue that political parties are long-lived entities
that can arrange transfers, or an intertemporal distribution of burdens, that will
induce voters to conform to the SNE outcome. Thus, it may be possible to justify
the use of the SNE equilibrium concept in this context. Nevertheless, in the next
section, we analyze the postelection politics game using equilibrium concepts that
consider only self-enforcing multilateral deviations.

5
5.1

Alternative Equilibrium Re…nements
Coalition-Proof Equilibria

As noted above, the strong Nash equilibrium concept requires considering deviations
by subsets of players that may not be self-enforcing. Thus, for certain deviations, it
may be the case that some subset of the deviators would wish to deviate from the
deviation. If so, then the original deviation is not consistent with the individual rationality of each player. In response, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) develop
the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (hereafter, CPNE). Intuitively, a Nash
equilibrium is not a CPNE if a subset of players can undertake a pro…table joint
deviation, and there are no further pro…table deviations by subsets of the deviating
coalition (holding the behavior of nondeviators …xed) that are self-enforcing.
Characterizing the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria of ¡ is di¢cult. We are
only able to prove that some policies cannot be implemented in a coalition-proof
¡
¢
equilibrium. (see Appendix 7.3). In particular, policies (x0 ; r0 ) such that x¤m ; rmin
is unanimously preferred by all voters to (x0 ; r 0) cannot be induced by a CPNE.
It is important to clarify that all this result establishes is that certain policies are
inconsistent with a CPNE. Nonetheless, it is possible to show that there exist some
¡
¢
nonmedian policies (i.e. policies other than x¤m; r min ) that are not eliminated by
imposing a requirement that there exist no self-enforcing deviations (i.e. by the
notion of coalition-proofness). For this, we require further re…nements, such as the
15

one introduced below.

5.2

Ideological Loyalty

Our basic model allows voters to choose any reservation utility bi 2 R, even if this
entails voting for the reelection of an incumbent whose ideology the voter …nds
repugnant. For example, if a “left” voter such as i = 1 sets bi = ¡1, she will
vote to reelect an incumbent who implements a policy on the extreme right, such
as x = x¤N . To address this issue, we introduce a fairly mild notion of “ideological
loyalty” on the part of voters; this entails that voters on the left do not vote for
incumbents who implement policies on the right, and vice versa:
De…nition 5 An “ideologically loyal” strategy is one for which the following holds:
if i · m (respectively, i ¸ m), i never votes for the reelection of an incumbent who
implements a policy x > x¤m (respectively, x < x¤m ). Thus, bi ¸ ui(x¤m ; rmin ) for all
i 2 f1; :::; Ng.
An ideologically loyal Nash equilibrium (ILNE) is a Nash equilibrium in ideologically loyal strategies for all voters
An ideologically loyal CPNE (ILCPNE) is a CPNE in ideologically loyal strategies for all voters
In the game that we are analyzing here, a precommitment to following an ideologically loyal strategy does not involve any problems of credibility for voters. This
is because, looking forward from the election, the incumbent and the challenger are
identical from the voter’s perspective. It cannot be denied, however, that in more
general settings, ideological loyalty may entail a commitment by voters that is not
always ex post optimal.
Re…ning the set of Nash equilibria (characterized in Section 3) using this notion
of ideological loyalty leads to the following result:
Proposition 6 If b is an ILNE pro…le of voter strategies, then the incumbent implements either (x¤m; r min ) or (x+ ; rmax ) (where x+ is determined by the incumbent’s
selection criterion over x, given r max).
Moreover, in any ILNE in which the incumbent is reelected, the incumbent always
implements (x¤m ; r min )
This result establishes that imposing a requirement of ideological loyalty on voter
strategies dramatically reduces the set of outcomes that can be sustained in a Nash
16

equilibrium. Essentially, either the median outcome will prevail, or the incumbent
will eschew the possibility of reelection, and extract maximal rents. In the latter case,
however, pro…table multilateral deviations will generally be possible. For example,
suppose that N = 5 and bi = +1; i = 1; :::; 5; the incumbent will implement some
policy (x+; r max ). If all voters deviate simultaneously to a strategic pro…le that
induces the incumbents to implement (x+; r min ), they would all be better o¤. Of
course, bearing in mind the reservations expressed earlier about the SNE concept,
we wish to focus only on multilateral deviations that are self-enforcing, and hence
on coalition-proof equilibria. The following result shows that there always exist
self-enforcing deviations from any ILNE that leads to rmax:
Proposition 7 If b is an ILCPNE pro…le of voter strategies, then the incumbent
always implements the policy (x¤m ; rmin )
Thus, as long as voters’ behavior conforms to the restriction embodied in the
assumption of ideological loyalty, the median voter outcome is the unique coalitionproof equilibrium outcome. This implies that, as long as we are prepared to accept
ideological loyalty as a reasonable constraint on voter strategies, nonmedian policy
outcomes can be ruled out as being subject to self-enforcing pro…table multilateral
deviations. Thus, Proposition 7 provides an alternative formulation of a median
voter theorem for postelection politics, without appealing to binding commitments
or implicit conventions among voters (as long as they satisfy the condition of ideological loyalty).

6

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has presented a median voter result for a model of postelection politics.
This can serve as a counterpart to analogous results in the study of preelection
politics, enabling us to answer the question of what policies we can expect to observe
as the outcome of electoral politics. There are a number of signi…cant lessons to be
drawn from this analysis. Most fundamentally, the game of postelection politics
that we analyze yields outcomes that converge on the center of the distribution
of voters’ preferences. Moreover, the rents that incumbent politicians can extract
while in o¢ce are restricted to the minimal level consistent with the contractual
incompleteness of political constitutions.
While these results are encouraging, it should be emphasized that they rely on
stringent requirements in terms of the enforceability of agreements and the existence
17

of perfect communication or implicit conventions among voters. A Nash equilibrium
outcome alone will not, in general, yield ideological policies that re‡ect the median
voter’s preferences, nor will it constrain the rent-seeking of incumbent politicians.
Our results thus provide some grounds for pessimism about the ability of electoral
politics to constrain politicians’ opportunistic behavior in circumstances where policy platforms are not binding.
We hope that this analysis can serve as a basis for further research on models
of postelection politics. To conclude, we discuss a few possible extensions. Firstly,
we have analyzed a model with a large, but …nite, number of voters. Assuming a
continuum of voters would, by making each voter negligible, presumably reinforce
the result that any policy can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Secondly, we have
assumed purely rent-maximizing politicians. An interesting extension would be to
consider policy-motivated candidates (as in Wittman (1977) and Calvert (1985)).
Presumably, it would then be possible to sustain equilibria with r < r min if the
incumbent cares su¢ciently about policy. Other possible extensions include considering multiple ideological dimensions (in addition to the rent dimension), and
heterogeneous types of politicians. Finally, we have focused on the case where the
“valence” characteristic of incumbents (rents) is a choice variable for the politician.
In adverse selection models of postelection politics (for instance, in the substantial
literature on political business cycles - see e.g. Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988) and Rogo¤
(1990)), this is instead an intrinsic characteristic, such as competence. It would be
of interest to consider the implications of this analysis for such models.
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7.1

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2

We prove Proposition 2 by means of two lemmas, as follows:
£
¤
Lemma 8 For any x+ 2 [x¤2; x¤N¡1] and any r + 2 r min ; r max , there exists a Nash
equilibrium pro…le of reservation utilities b+ that supports the policy (x+ ; r+ ), where
x¤2 and x¤N¡1 are the ideal points of voters 2 and N ¡ 1, respectively
The proof essentially generalize the example
given
in Figure 1. Consider an
¡
¢
¹ of the set of voters f1; :::; Ng
exhaustive and mutually exclusive partition §; §
¹ = f1; :::; Ng and § \ §
¹ = ;), such that f1; 2; N ¡ 1; N g ½ § and
(so that § [ §
¯ ¯
N+1
N+3
N¡3
¹¯ =
j§j = 2 + 1 = 2 =) ¯§
(where j§j denotes the cardinality of the
2
set §). Thus, § consists of a minimal supermajority of voters (i.e. one more than
required for a majority) and includes the two extreme leftist and extreme rightist
voters. Now suppose that voters choose a vector of reservation utilities b where:
½
ui (x0; r 0 ) if i 2 §
bi =
(13)
¹
1
if i 2 §
£
¤
for some arbitrary policy (x0 ; r0 ), where x0 2 [x¤2; x¤N¡1] and r0 2 r min ; r max . Clearly,
an incumbent who faces this b and implements (x0 ; r0 ) will be reelected, with the
votes of all voters in §. We wish to prove that implementing (x0 ; r0 ) is indeed the
best response to this b by the incumbent, and that the bi speci…ed above is a best
response of each voter to the incumbent’s strategy (x0 ; r0 jb) and to b¡i.
To prove this, note …rst that, given this b, the incumbent will never choose any
policy involving r < r0 , as this is dominated by (x0 ; r0 ) (which satis…es the reelection
constraint, and yields higher rent). Given this, we can then show that the incumbent
will never choose a policy with x 6= x0 and r ¸ r 0. Consider without loss of generality
x < x0: by the strict quasi-concavity of ui (:), ui (x; r) · ui (x; r0 ) < ui(x0 ; r0 ) = bi
for i = N ¡ 1; N (i.e. deviating to (x; r) leads to the reelection rules of voters N
and N ¡ 1 being violated). Thus, at least 2 voters in § (voters N and N ¡ 1) will
20

¹ (a total of at least N+1
vote against reelection, along, of course, with all voters in §
2
voters). This is su¢cient to cause the incumbent’s defeat; thus, the incumbent will
not deviate to any x < x0 . A symmetric argument establishes that the incumbent
will not deviate to any (x; r) with x > x0 and r ¸ r 0 . Given that x = x0 , note
that the incumbent cannot implement any policy with r > r0 and be reelected. For
all voters in §, ui(x0 ; r) < ui(x0 ; r 0) = bi when r > r0 ; thus, all voters would vote
against the incumbent’s reelection. Note also that r 0 ¸ rmin implies that (x0; r 0 ) is
preferable (from the incumbent’s point of view) to implementing r max and foregoing
reelection. Hence, implementing (x0 ; r0 ) is the incumbent’s best response to the b
speci…ed above.
Now consider deviations by voter i from the speci…ed bi .
² Suppose i 2 §. Setting a higher bi will not change the incumbent’s optimal
action - there is still a majority of voters who will reelect if (x0 ; r0 ) is implemented, so the arguments above continue to hold. Voter i’s deviation will lead
to I i = 0 (i.e. to i voting against the incumbent), but as the outcome (x0 ; r0 )
does not change, i is not strictly better o¤ by deviating. Unilaterally setting
a lower bi cannot lead to a strict increase in voter i’s payo¤.
¹ setting a higher bi keeps her outside the winning coalition. Setting
² For i 2 §;
a lower bi can only change the policy implemented in a way that decreases
voter i’s payo¤.
Lemma 9 If b+ is a Nash equilibrium pro…le of reservation utilities £that leads ¤to
reelection and supports policy (x+ ; r+), then x+ 2 [x¤2; x¤N¡1] and r + 2 r min ; r max
£
¤
Note …rst that r + 2
= r min ; r max is inconsistent with the incumbent seeking reelection. Now, assume that x¤N¡1 < x+ (noting that a symmetric proof exists for
x+ < x¤2). First, we establish that there exists some (x0 ; r0 ) such that x0 < x+ and
(x0 ; r0 ) is strictly preferred to (x+; r+ ) by both voter N ¡ 1 and by the incumbent:

² suppose that r + < r max; as x+ > x¤N¡1 , (x+ ; r+ ) cannot be an ideal point for
voter N ¡1. Hence, by the strict quasi-concavity of uN¡1(:), there exists some
(x0 ; r0 ) such that r 0 > r+ and uN¡1 (x0 ; r0 ) > uN¡1 (x+; r+ ) Furthermore,
x0 < x+; otherwise, if x0 ¸ x+, uN¡1 (x0 ; r0 ) < uN¡1 (x0 ; r+ ) · uN¡1 (x+ ; r+)).
Note that the incumbent strictly prefers (x0 ; r0 ) to (x+ ; r+ ), as r0 > r+ .

.

0 0
² suppose that r + = rmax, and consider
; r ¢) = (x¤N¡1; r max ): as xN ¡1 is the
¡ ¤ (xmax
ideal point of voter N ¡¡ 1, uN¡1 x¢N¡1; r
> uN¡1 (x+; r +). Note that the
incumbent also prefers x¤N¡1; rmax to (x+; r +) by the assumption of nonextremist preferences.

By the SCP condition (6), ui (x0; r 0 ) > ui (x+; r +) for i 2 f1; :::; N ¡ 1g. Since,
(x ; r +) is implemented in a Nash equilibrium, at least N+1
voters must vote for
2
+ +
reelection (i.e. set bi · ui (x ; r )). Then, there are two possibilities:
+

1. at least N+1
voters in f1; :::; N ¡ 1g vote for reelection. For these voters,
2
+
+
bi · ui (x ; r ) < ui (x0; r 0 ). But then, the incumbent would be reelected
if she implements (x0 ; r0 ) instead of (x+; r +), and prefers the former. Thus,
(x+; r +) cannot be implemented in equilibrium.
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2. exactly N¡1
voters in f1; :::; N ¡ 1g vote for reelection, along with voter N .
2
Then, consider a voter in f1; :::; N ¡ 1g who votes against reelection (i.e. sets
bi > ui (x0 ; r 0)). A deviation by this voter to b0i = ui (x0 ; r 0) allows the incumbent to implement (x0; r 0) instead of (x+ ; r+ ), which raises the deviator’s payo¤
(and is preferred by the nonextreme incumbent). Thus, b+ cannot be a Nash
equilibrium pro…le of reservation utilities.
Thus, (x+; r +), where x+ > x¤N¡1 and r + 2 [rmin ; rmax ], cannot be sustained as a
Nash equilibrium. A symmetric argument establishes that (x+; r +), where x+ < x¤2
and r + 2 [r min ; rmax], cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium.

7.2

Proof of proposition 4

We prove Proposition 4 by means of two lemmas, as follows:
Lemma 10 Let b¤i = ui (x¤m; r min ) for voters i = 1; :::; N. Then, b¤ = (b¤1; :::; b¤N ) is
a strong (and Majoritarian) Nash equilibrium pro…le of voter strategies
First, we establish that, when faced with b¤ = (b¤1; :::; b¤N ), the incumbent will implement (x¤m ; rmin ). Noting
that¢the incumbent will never implement r <¡ rmin , con¡
¢
sider a policy (x0 ; r0 ) 6= x¤m ; rmin where r0 ¸ r min . Then, um (x0 ; r0 ) < um x¤m; r min =
b¤m by the uniqueness of m’s ideal point; thus, m will vote against reelection. For
the other voters, there are two possible cases: ¡ x0 ¸ x¤m¢ and x0 · x¤m . Consider
x0 ¸ x¤m: for i 2 f1; :::; m ¡ 1g; ui (x0 ; r0 ) < ui x¤m ; rmin = b¤i by the SCP condition (6). Thus, all these voters (in addition to m, a total of N+1
) will ¡vote against
2
¢
0
¤
0 0
reelection. Consider x · xm : for i 2 fm + 1; :::; N g; ui (x ; r ) < ui x¤m ; rmin =
b¤i by the SCP condition (6). Thus, all these voters (in addition to m, a total of
N+1
0 0
2 ) will vote against reelection. Hence, any policy (x ; r ) will lead to defeat. In
¤
min
contrast, (xm; r ) satis…es the reelection constraints of all voters, and hence leads
to reelection. Thus, the incumbent will implement (x¤m ; rmin ).
Next, we show that, given that it leads to (x¤m ; rmin) being implemented, b¤ =
(b¤1; :::; b¤N ) is a strong Nash equilibrium pro…le of voter strategies. Speci…cally, we
consider multilateral deviations by a subset
b¢ ¤ , and show that, if
¡ d ofd ¢voters
¡ ¤from
the deviation leads to some other policy x ; r 6= xm; r min being implemented,
it cannot make every deviating voter strictly better o¤. Let §d µ f1; :::; Ng be a
¤
coalition of voters who deviate
Suppose
that this deviation induces the
¡ d d ¢from
¡ ¤b . min
¢
incumbent to implement x ; r 6= xm ; r
; noting that the incumbent will never
implement r < rmin , it must be that case that rd ¸ rmin . Let §L be the
¡ d subset
¢
d
of ¡voters who
are
worse
o¤
as
a
result
of
the
deviation
i.e.
i
2
§
if
u
x
;
r
<
L
i
¢
ui x¤m ; rmin . Using the SCP condition (6), if xd ¸ x¤m , then fm; :::; Ng µ §L, while
if xd · x¤m, then f1; :::; mg µ § L; in either case, j§L j ¸ N 2+1 (i.e. a majority of
voters are worse o¤ as a result of the deviation).
Now suppose that the deviating coalition §d contains no members of §L (i.e.
§L \ §d = ;). Then, it follows that j§d j < ¡N+1
, and
2
¢ that the reelection constraints
d d
for a majority of voters are¡ not satis…ed
if x ; r is implemented (as j§Lj ¸ N 2+1 ,
¢
and b¤i = ui (x¤m ; rmin) > ui xd; r d for i 2 §L). But, this implies that the incumbent
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¡
¢
will not be reelected by implementing xd; r d , and hence
premise
¡ dcontradicts
¢ ¡ ¤ the
¢
d
min
that the deviation induces the incumbent to implement x ; r 6= xm ; r
. Now
suppose instead that the deviating coalition §d contains at least one member of § L
(i.e. §L \ §d 6= ;). But then at least one member of the deviating coalition is
not strictly better o¤ as a result of the deviation (i.e. the deviation is not strictly
bene…cial for all deviators).
Thus, there is no feasible deviation from b¤ by a subset of voters that makes each
deviator
to implement a policy other
¡ ¤ strictly
¢ better o¤ and induces¤ the incumbent
min
¤
¤
than xm ; r
. This implies that b = (b1; :::; bN ) is a strong Nash equilibrium
pro…le of voter strategies. Furthermore, b¤ is also a Majoritarian Nash equilibrium
pro…le of voters strategies.
This establishes the existence of a policy that can be supported by a strong Nash
equilibrium pro…le of voter strategies. Next, we turn to the issue of uniqueness:
Lemma 11 If b0 = (b01; :::; b0N ) is a¡strong (or
¢ Majoritarian) Nash equilibrium pro…le
of voter strategies, then the policy x¤m; r min is always implemented
Suppose that b0 = (b01 ; :::; b0N ) is a Majoritarian Nash equilibrium pro…le of voter
strategies, (remember that if b0 is a SNE, it is a fortiori a MNE) and let (x0; r 0) be
the policy¡implemented
by the incumbent when faced with b0. Then, suppose that
¢
0
0
¤
min
(x ; r ) 6= xm ; r
(bearing in mind that r 0 ¸ rmin by the incumbent’s¡ incentive¢
compatibility constraint). We proceed by showing that for any (x0; r 0) 6= x¤m ; rmin
there exists a pro…table deviation by a subset of voters (thereby contradicting the
premise that b0 is a Majoritarian Nash¡ equilibrium
pro…le of voter strategies).
¢
0 0
¤
min
Consider the case where (x ; r ) 6= xm ; r
, with x0 ¸ x¤m and r 0 ¸ rmin (note
0
that a symmetric argument is available for x · x¤m ). We partition the set of voters
into 2 mutually exhaustive and exhaustive
subsets,
based on whether the voter
¡
¢
would vote for reelection if the policy ¡x¤m ; rmin ¢ were implemented. Let §A be
the subset of¡voters who
choose b0i > ui x¤m ; rmin (and would hence vote against
¢
min
¹ A be the subset of voters who
reelection if x¤m
implemented), and §
¡ ; ¤r minwere
¢
¡
¢
0
choose bi · ui xm ; r
(and would hence vote for reelection if x¤m ; rmin were
¹ A = ; and §A [ §
¹ A = f1; :::; Ng.
implemented). Note that §A \ §
Consider the subset of voters i > m (i.e. fm + 1; :::; Ng): we partition these
voters into 2 mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets. Let §3 denote the set of
¹ A, and let § 4 denote the set of voters i > m who are in
voters i > m who are in §
§A:
©
¡
¢ª
¹ A = i > m jb0i · ui x¤m ; rmin
§3 = fm + 1; :::; Ng \ §
(14)
©
¡
¢ª
§4 = fm + 1; :::; N g \ § A = i > m jb0i > ui x¤m ; rmin

(15)

Let k = j§3 j, noting that 0 · k · N 2¡1 and that j§ 4j = N¡1
2 ¡ k.
Now consider the subset of voters f1; :::; mg. We partition this set into 2 mutually
exclusive and exhaustive subsets. Let §1 be a set consisting of the median voter m
and of ( N+1
2 ¡ k ¡ 1) other (arbitrarily chosen) members of f1; :::; mg, and let §2 be
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the complement of §1 in f1; ::; mg (so that it includes the remainder of f1; :::; mg).
Note that j§1 j = N+1
2 ¡ k and j§2j = k.
0
Given that b is a strong Nash equilibrium pro…le of voter strategies that induces
policy (x0; r 0 ), consider the following joint deviation by all voters belonging to the
set § 1 [ §2 from b0i to bdi , where
½ ¡ ¤ min ¢
ui xm ; r
if i 2 §1
d
bi =
(16)
1
if i 2 §2
(with the strategies of all voters i 2 § 3 ¡[ §4 held
…xed at b0i). Faced with this
¢
deviation, the ¡incumbent
will implement x¤m; r min . To show this, note …rst that
¢
N+1
implementing x¤m ; rmin induces all voters in §1 [§ 3 (a total of N+1
2 ¡ k+ k = 2 )
to vote for reelection, and thus¡leads to¢the incumbent being reelected. Moreover,
implementing any (x+; r +) 6= x¤m; r min¡ with r¢+ ¸ rmin will lead to defeat. To
establish this point, note …rst that um x¤m; r min > um(x+ ; r+ ) (by the uniqueness
of m’s ideal point). For other voters, there are 3 cases¡ to consider:
¢
+
¤
+ +
¤
min
(i)
Suppose
that
x
>
x
:
u
(x
;
r
)
<
u
x
;
r
=) ui (x+; r +) <
m
m
m
m
¡ ¤ min ¢
ui ¡xm ; r ¢ for all i < m (by the SCP condition (6)). In particular, ui(x+; r +) <
ui x¤m ; rmin = bdi for all i 2 §1, so all voters in §1 [ §2 (a total of N 2+1 ) will vote
against reelection, and the incumbent cannot implement this type of policy and be
reelected.
¡ ¤ min ¢
+
¤
+ +
(ii)
Suppose
that
x
<
x
:
u
(x
;
r
)
<
u
xm; r
=) ui(x+; r +) <
m
m
m
¡ ¤ min ¢
ui xm ; r
for all i > m (by the SCP condition (6)) i.e. for i 2 §3 [ §4 . Thus,
implementing
(x¢+ ; r+ ) will lead m, all voters in §2 , and all voters in §4 (who set
¡ ¤ min
0
N+1
b i > ui xm ; r
) will vote against reelection. This is a total of 1+k+ N¡1
2 ¡k = 2
voters, so the incumbent cannot implement this type of policy and be¡ reelected.
¢
(iii) Suppose that x+ = x¤m and r+ > rmin : then, ui(x+; r +) < ui x¤m; r min for
N¡1
all i. All voters in § 1 [ §2 [§ 4 will vote against reelection (a total of N+1
2 + 2 ¡k
voters, and hence a majority), so the incumbent cannot implement this type of
policy and be reelected.
¡
¢
+
min
Thus, the incumbent cannot implement any (x+ ; r+ ) 6= x¤m¡; rmin with
¢ r ¸ 0r 0
¤
min
and be reelected. Note also that by the SCP condition (6), ui xm; r
> ui (x ; r )
for all i 2 §1 [ §2, so every member of the deviating coalition
is
strictly
better o¤
¡
¢
under the policy implemented when they deviate (i.e. x¤m ; r min ) than under the
policy induced by b0 (i.e. (x0 ; r0 )). But, this contradicts the premise that b0 is a
strong Nash equilibrium pro…le of voter strategies.
¡
¢
A symmetric argument can be made for the case where (x0 ; r0 ) 6= x¤m ; rmin , with
x0 · x¤m and r0 ¸ r min , with:
©
¡
¢ª
§ 1 = i ¸ m j bdi = ui x¤m ; rmin
©
ª
§ 2 = i > m j bdi = 1
©
¡
¢ª
§ 3 = i < m j b0i · ui x¤m ; rmin
©
¡
¢ª
§ 4 = i < m j b0i > ui x¤m ; rmin
24

N +1
¡k
2
j§2j = k
j§1j =

j§3 j = k
N ¡1
j§4j =
¡k
2

Thus, if b0 is a Majoritarian
¡ Nash¢ equilibrium pro…le of voter strategies, the
policy implemented is always x¤m ; rmin .

7.3

Coalition-Proof Equilibria

It is possible, to characterize certain subsets of policies that cannot be sustained in
any CPNE. Consider the following subset of the policy space:
©
¡
¢ª
De…nition 12 Let §1 ¡= i j bi¢< ui x¤m ; rmin µ § = f1; :::; Ng be the subset of
voters who set bi < ui x¤m ; r min . Then, let - 1 be the subset of the policy space de…ned by
©
¡
¢ª
-1 = (x; r) j 8i 2 §1, ui (x; r) < ui x¤m ; r min
If § 1is empty, we adopt the convention that -1 = ;.

¡
¢
Thus, -1 is the set of all policies that are inferior to the median policy x¤m ; rmin
from the point of view of all voters in §1 (note that § 1 includes only
subset
of
¡ ¤ amin
¢
those voters who would vote ¡for an incumbent
who
implements
x
;
r
,
as
it
m
¢
¤
min
excludes those who set bi = ui xm ; r
). Note that -1 is nonempty - for¡ instance,¢
¤
0
0
min
any policy (xm ; r ), where r > r
is an element of -1, as ui (x¤m ; r0 ) < ui x¤m ; rmin
for all voters (and hence for all voters in § 1). Using this de…nition, we can show
that no CPNE involves a policy in the set -1 (and, moreover, this result always
rules out some feasible policies, as -1 is nonempty):
Lemma 13 i) If b = (b1; :::; bN ) is a CPNE pro…le of voter strategies that induces
the incumbent to implement (x0; r 0), then (x0 ; r 0) 2
= -1 :
ii) If b = (b1; :::; bN ) is a CPNE pro…le of voter strategies that induces
incum¡ the
¢
0 0
0 0
¤
bent to implement (x ; r ), then for at least one voter j, uj (x ; r ) > uj xm; r min :
i) Suppose that (x0 ; r0 ) 2 -1 . Without loss of generality, we can consider the
case x0 · x¤m, where
the¢ single crossing condition (6) implies that 8 i 2 fm; :::; Ng ;
¡ ¤ min
0 0
¹ 1 = §1 [ fm; :::; Ng (note that §
¹ 1 always includes a
ui (x ; r ) < ui xm ; r
. Let §
0
0
majority
of¢voters, even when §1 is empty). For i 2 § 1, (x ; r ) 2 -1 ) ui (x0 ; r 0) <
¡ ¤ min
ui xm ; r
(by the de…nition above), so that:
¡
¢
¹1
8i 2 §
ui (x0 ; r0 ) < ui x¤m; r min
(17)
¹ 2 denote the complement of §
¹ 1 in § such that §
¹1 \ §
¹ 2 = ; and §
¹1 [ §
¹2 =
Let §
f1; :::; Ng. Hence,
©
¡
¢ª
¹ 2 = i 2 f1; :::; m ¡ 1g such that bi ¸ ui x¤m ; r min
§
Consider the following two cases:

¡
¢
¹ 1 set bi = ui x¤m ; rmin (this can only be true if §1 is empty,
1. All voters in §
¡ ¤ min ¢
and
all
i
2
fm;
:::;
Ng
set
b
=
u
xm ; r
). Then¡ all i 2 fm;
i
i
¡ ¤ min ¢
¢ :::; Ng set bi =
¤
min
ui xm ; r
and¡ all i 2 ¢f1; :::; m ¡ 1g set bi ¸ ui ¡xm ; r ¢. The incumbent
will implement x¤m ; r min (any policy other than ¡ x¤m; r min¢ will result in at
least m voters voting against reelection). Clearly, x¤m; r min 2
= -1 = ;, so the
proposition is true in this case.
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¡
¢
¹ 1 sets bi 6= ui x¤m; r min (this will always hold whenever
2. At least one voter in §
¹ 1 who do not
§1 is nonempty).
Consider
a deviation
by¢all those members of §
¡ ¤ min
¢
¡ ¤ min
0
set bi = ui xm ; r
to bi = ui xm ;¡r
. We
¢ show …rst that this deviation
¤
min
induces the incumbent to implement xm; r
. If the incumbent implements:
¡
¢
¹ 1, and so is reelected.
(a) x¤m; r min she receives the votes of all voters in §

(b) (x+ ; r+ ) with x+ · x¤m and r+ > rmin , all voters in¡ fm; :::; Ng
¢ (i.e. at least
m voters) vote against reelection because b0i = ui x¤m ; rmin > ui (x+ ; r+ ).
¹ 1 vote against
(c) (x+ ; r+ ) with x+ ¸ x¤m and¡ r+ > r min
::; mg\§
¢ , voters+in f1;
0
¤
min
+
¹ 2 vote
reelection because bi = ui xm; r ¡ > ui (x¢ ; r ), and voters in §
¤
min
+
+
against reelection because bi ¸ ui xm; r
> ui (x ; r ). Thus, at least
the m voters in f1; :::; mg vote against reelection.
¡
¢
The deviation therefore unambiguously induces x¤m ; rmin . Note also that it is
¹ 1 , so that ui (x0; r 0) <
strictly
for all deviators, as they all belong to §
¡ ¤ pro…table
¢
ui xm ; rmin .
¹1 \
Now consider further deviations by subsets of the deviators. A subset of §
fm + 1; Ng may wish to deviate to induce a higher x. But then, by the preceding
argument (c) above, all voters in f1; :::; mg vote against the incumbent’s reelection.
¹ 1 \ f1; m ¡ 1g may wish to deviate to induce a lower x. But
Similarly, a subset of §
then, by the preceding argument (b) above, all voters in fm; :::; Ng vote against the
incumbent’s reelection. There is therefore no further successful pro…table deviation.
Thus, if b is a CPNE pro…le of voter strategies that induces the incumbent
to implement (x0 ; r0 ), and if (x0 ; r 0) 2 - 1 with x0 · x¤m , then there exists a selfenforcing pro…table deviation by a subset of voters. Moreover, this deviation is
immune to further successful deviations by subsets of the deviators. This contradicts
the premise that b is a CPNE pro…le of voter strategies. An analogous argument is
possible for x0 ¸ x¤m . Thus, it follows that if b is a CPNE pro…le of voter strategies,
then (x0 ; r 0) 2
= -1 . ©
¡
¢ª
ii) De…ne -2 = (x; r) j 8i 2 f1; :::; Ng , ui (x; r) < ui x¤m; r min . Then clearly
-2 µ -1 . So by i), one has ¡(x0 ; r0 ) 2
=¢-2. This implies that for at least one voter
0
0
¤
min
j 2 f1; :::; Ng uj (x ; r ) ¸ uj xm ; r

7.4

Proof of Proposition 6

¡
¢
Let b be an ILNE pro…le of voter strategies (i.e. bi ¸ ui x¤m; r min for all i). Suppose
that b induces the incumbent to seek reelection. Then, assume that the incumbent
implements (x0 ; r0 ) 6= (x¤m ; rmin ). Consider the case where x0 · x¤m (an analogous
argument exists for the case where x0 ¸ x¤m ). Clearly, um(x0 ; r 0) < um (x¤m; r min ). By
the SCP and the de…nition of ideological loyalty, it follows that for all i 2 fm; :::; Ng
ui (x0 ; r 0) < ui (x¤m; r min ) · bi

(18)

Thus, if the incumbent implements (x0; r 0 ), a majority of voters fm; :::; Ng will vote
against reelection. But, this contradicts the premise that b induces the incumbent
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to seek reelection and that the incumbent implements (x0; r 0 ) 6= (x¤m ; r min ) in equilibrium. Thus, any ILNE in which the incumbent is reelected must lead to the
implementation of the policy (x¤m ; rmin ).
In any equilibrium in which the incumbent is not reelected, the incumbent will
always extract maximal rents rmax , and implement an x+ determined by the selection
criterion over x (given rmax ). An ILNE pro…le of voter strategies b does not eliminate
the possibility that the incumbent will not seek reelection (e.g. consider N = 5 and
bi = +1; i = 1; :::; 5). Thus, (x+; r max ) is also an outcome that can be sustained in
an ILNE.

7.5

Proof of proposition 7

Suppose that b is an ILCPNE pro…le of voter strategies, and that the incumbent
implements (x0 ; r0 ) 6= (x¤m; r min ). Consider the case where x0 ¸ x¤m, with r0 ¸ r max .
Now, consider the deviation in equation
(16)
¡
¢ in the proof of Proposition 4 (note
¹ A set bi = ui x¤m; r min to satisfy ideological loyalty). As we
that here, voters in §
¡
¢
showed there, this deviation induces the incumbent to implement x¤m ; rmin , and is
strictly pro…table for all deviators. Note that the deviators adopt an ideological loyal
strategy. For a CPNE, we also need to ask whether the deviation is self-enforcing.
We show that when voters are ideologically loyal, no further successful deviation
is feasible. While m cannot bene…t by deviating, some subset of f1; :::; m ¡ 1g could
potentially bene…t by a deviation that induces the incumbent to move x to the
left (i.e. x < x¤m ). This subset, however, includes at most N¡1
voters, so, for the
2
deviation to be successful, it would require at least one voter i > m to vote for
reelection when x < x¤m is implemented. But, by the assumption that all voters are
playing ideologically loyal strategies, 8i > m, bi ¸ ui(x¤m ; rmin ). Thus, no i ¸ m will
vote for reelection when x < x¤m, so a deviation from the equation (16) deviation by
a subset of f1; :::; m ¡ 1g cannot be successful.
An analogous argument holds for x0 · x¤m . Therefore, any equilibrium involving
a policy (x0 ; r 0) 6= (x¤m ; rmin ) is subject to a deviation that is not subject to any
further deviations. This contradicts the premise that b is an ILCPNE pro…le of
voter strategies; hence, the incumbent always implements the policy (x¤m; r min ).
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